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I.  Introduction
Federal judges occupy an odd position in our republic. On the one hand,
these judges have an awesome responsibility to say what the law is. They
enjoin presidential acts, strike down state laws, and divine the meaning of
constitutional rights. On the other, our Constitution affords these legal elites
life tenure, a length of service not granted either to legislators or the
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elected, often will remain in o ce long after the president who nominated
them leaves o ce. Strengthening the judiciary’s independence, Congress
cannot reduce judicial salaries and has long declined to impeach judges
when they issue unpopular decisions.
Federal judges, to be sure, tend to agree with each other in the mine run of
cases.  But the worry remains that—at least in the most politically divisive
cases—these unelected and unremovable jurists will turn into “politicians in
robes.”  Some judges recognize that their “only source of democratic
legitimacy is the perception that [they] engage in principled decision-
making.”  The contention that certain judges do not even follow agreed-
upon procedural rules challenges this perception. After all, “[p]ublic
con dence in th[e] court[s] . . . is premised on the certainty that the court
follows the rules in every case, regardless of the question that a particular
case presents.”
This Essay, therefore, examines the assignment of judges in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to see how its assignment rules play out in
practice. The  rst step is a review of the rules themselves. The Sixth Circuit’s
history of procedural disputes—which came to a head with the publication of
Judge Boggs’s Procedural Appendix in Grutter v. Bollinger —and research
about the nonrandomness of judicial assignment provide insight into
potential weaknesses in the assignment system. Next, this Essay continues
with its chief contribution: an analysis of Sixth Circuit case assignments
from 2012 through 2016, a  ve-year period when the composition of the
court remained relatively consistent. This analysis suggests that, for
whatever reason, the senior judge assignment system tends to enhance the
perceived partisan preferences of senior judges. In other words, senior
judges nominated by Democratic presidents tend to sit with other
Democratic nominees, and senior judges nominated by Republican
presidents tend to sit with other Republican nominees. This preference is
most pronounced among Democratic-nominated senior judges and
enhances the voting strength of Democratic judges, who are a minority
among the active judges on the Sixth Circuit. This Essay considers potential
non-nefarious explanations for these tendencies and concludes by weighing
how this dynamic will impact the Sixth Circuit as several Republican-
nominated judges have taken senior status during the Trump Administration.
II.  A History of Procedural Quarrels
Contrary to what one might expect, judicial assignment on the Sixth Circuit is
not random, even if the circuit clerk follows the assignment rules.
Nevertheless, the circuit clerk, under the direction of the chief judge,
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randomness. The Sixth Circuit “sits over two-week periods scheduled so as
to afford all judges at least  ve weeks between sittings.”  “The clerk
prepares the calendar for a session before the composition of panels” during
these two weeks “is determined.”  To approximate randomness, “[t]he clerk
balances the calendars by dividing the cases as evenly as possible among
the panels according to case type and the district of origin.”  There is no
wheel that churns out a randomly-assigned three-judge panel for each
discrete case. After the circuit clerk divides the cases into groups, the judges
are “assigned to panels during the sitting weeks using an automated routine
which searches the court’s database to determine which active judges have
the longest intervals between sitting pairing.”
While not exactly random for each individual case, this common practice
“attempts to equalize co-sits” and “is the functional equivalent of taking a
coin and placing it on heads once, then placing it on tails once, and so on,
instead of actually tossing it. That is, the practice uses a nonrandom process
to create results that are meant to be consistent with randomness.”
But there is a catch. Although “[a]ll active judges are scheduled to sit four
consecutive days during one of the two sitting weeks,”  senior judges can
pick and choose which sittings they attend. To earn his pay each year, a
senior judge must perform work that “in the aggregate equals at least 3
months[’] work” of an active judge.  Senior judges in the Sixth Circuit have
the discretion to work as much or as little as they want the other three
quarters of the year. One senior judge may keep an almost full caseload
while another teaches a law school class and visits grandchildren.  In
several circuits, “[t]he calendar preferences of senior judges [a]re given
particular weight—a senior judge’s request to sit during a given week in a
given month might be accommodated—to encourage those judges to provide
as many days of service as possible.”  And on the Sixth Circuit, the
automated assignment system assigns senior judges after active judges are
already in place: “The automated program  rst pairs active judges based on
intervals between pairings and then adds senior circuit judges and visiting
judges to pairings, again determined by the longest interval between pairings
with either judge in the assembled pairs.”
Despite the best efforts of the assignment system, this process might
produce nonrandom results if senior judges tend to sit more or less
frequently during the same weeks as certain active judges. For example, a
senior judge may enjoy sitting with a judge who is a former clerk or who
comes from the senior judge’s own city. The senior judge could then build his
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Additional procedural quirks might add to the nonrandomness of merits case
assignment. “In cases not yet assigned to a merits panel, substantive
motions are assigned to randomly assembled panels drawn from among
active and senior circuit judges and visiting judges designated to sit with the
court.”  This mostly  random assignment system led to problems in
Grutter v. Bollinger.  That case touched on a politically sensitive issue:
a rmative action. “In August 1999,” a Sixth Circuit panel “consisting of
Circuit Judges Daughtrey and Moore”—both Democratic appointees—and a
visiting senior district court judge “decided an appeal concerning the rights
of certain parties to intervene in the district court case underlying the [later
Grutter] appeal, but did not address the merits of the case.”  When the
cases returned to the Sixth Circuit, “a question could have arisen regarding
whether these appeals, seeking review of cases already returned to the
district court by a panel of this court, were ‘must panel’ cases” under 6th Cir.
I.O.P. 34(b)(2).  This procedure allows “the original panel [to] determine to
hear the appeal or whether it should be assigned to a panel at random.”
Under the current rules, “[w]here it is necessary to bring in a new judge to
complete the panel,” such as when a panelist was a visiting judge or has
retired, “the clerk will draw a name from among the active judges not already
on the panel.”
That is not what happened in Grutter. Instead, then-Chief Judge Martin—also
a Democratic-nominated judge—decided to augment these panels “by the
addition of” himself, “not a randomly chosen judge.”  This panel heard all
further motions regarding these appeals and sat on an en banc petition,
which the circuit clerk normally circulates after fourteen days to the entire
court,  for  ve months.  During those  ve months, two Republican-
appointed judges took senior status.  This delayed circulation of the en
banc petition allowed the entirely Democratic-appointed panel to have the
case heard before an en banc court that consisted of only three Republican-
appointees, and the Democratic-appointed panel won out with a  ve to four
en banc vote.  Judge Boggs, frustrated with the lack of procedural
transparency, aired these dubious procedural moves by publishing a
Procedural Appendix at the end of his dissent.  Otherwise, the public would
never have learned about the procedural inconsistencies.
III.  The Parameters of the Study
This Essay, therefore, analyzes the assignment of all Sixth Circuit judges—
both active and senior—in continuous service from 2012 through 2016 to
query whether any procedural abnormalities are occurring behind the scenes.
A previous study of all federal circuit courts from 2008 to 2012 found that
the Sixth Circuit tended to pack Republican appointees onto three-
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and Republican-appointees) leaned Democratic more often than simulations
would expect.  As former-Judge Posner explained using the opposite set
of circumstances, this is what one would expect if a liberal chief judge
wanted to waste Republican votes and maximize the effectiveness of
Democratic votes.
Although the previous analysis of all circuit courts did not produce
statistically signi cant results for the Sixth Circuit,  this Essay uses an
approach tailored to the Sixth Circuit. For starters, this Essay uses the
political party identi cation of the president who initially nominated each
judge as a proxy for ideology rather than the president under whose watch
the judge was ultimately appointed.  This change reclassi es Judge White
as Democratic and accurately re ects the political compromise between
President George W. Bush and Senate Democrats that allowed Michigander
Judges White and Kethledge to assume their seats on the Sixth Circuit.
Next, this Essay uses the  ve years from 2012 through 2016 due to the
stability of the Sixth Circuit during this timeframe. Fifteen active judges (six
Democratic nominees and nine Republican nominees) and eight senior
judges (four from each party) heard cases throughout the  ve-year period.
One senior judge retired from judicial service in 2012, but she participated in
only nineteen opinions that year that made their way onto Westlaw.  Judge
Martin (the Chief Judge during Grutter) retired directly from active service in
2013 in the midst of an investigation into his travel expense reimbursements.
 Nonetheless, his 517 cases are consistent with the  ndings of this Essay:
active judges have a slight tendency to sit with active judges of the opposite
party but a strong tendency to sit with senior judges of their own party.
That brings us to the last major deviation of this Essay from prior study.
Unlike other studies, this Essay does not rely on oral argument information
from calendar docket sheets.  Such an approach would have the
weaknesses of failing to capture non-argument cases and potentially
overstating the signi cance of a panel organized to hear arguments in a
single must case.  Instead, this Essay looks to panel assignments in all
Sixth Circuit opinions available on Westlaw.  This Essay determines the
number of times each Sixth Circuit judge paired with another—a key
consideration in the circuit’s assignment system—and then averages out the
number of cases by ideological category and active/senior status. This
approach accounts for random  uctuations among pairings and the fact that
chief judges take a reduced caseload due to their administrative
responsibilities. On the whole, Democratic active judges had about the same
average cases per judge as Republican active judges: respectively, 887.17
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frequently and accounted for 53.65% of total case assignments to
Republican senior judges’ 46.35%.
This approach adds a different viewpoint on case assignments but, of
course, has its own weaknesses. En banc assignments count as a panel
assignment for each judge on the en banc panel. This increases the number
of cases for active judges across the board, however, and there appear to
have been no more than twenty relevant en banc opinions during this period.
Additionally, this approach might overstate the importance of cases with
multiple iterations or orders or fail to include various unpublished decisions
not on Westlaw. This approach, nevertheless, addresses the non-argument
cases to a greater degree than an alternative docket-sheet approach. The
Essay is not a comprehensive statistical study but provides insight into the
most salient features of nonrandomness in Sixth Circuit case assignment.
IV.  Apparent Nonrandomness of Senior Judge Assignment
This Essay  nds that active judges pair in mostly random ways even though
senior judges do not. Table 1 summarizes the statistics for active judges
nominated by a Democratic president.














Cole 727 72.4 75.66666667 -3.266666667
Moore 936 99.2 96.22222222 2.977777778
Clay 958 91.8 86.22222222 5.577777778
White 937 88.2 98.33333333 -10.13333333
Stranch 916 91.6 99.66666667 -8.066666667
Donald 849 86.8 89.66666667 -2.866666667
Averages 887.1666667 88.33333333 90.96296296 -2.62962963
The second column (“Total Cases”) counts every time a judge participated in
an opinion. Chief Judge Cole, for example, participated in 727 opinions
issued from 2012 through 2016. I then counted how many times the active
judge participated in a case with each other active judge and aggregated the
[40]
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numbers by political party of the president nominating the other judges.
Thus, Democratic active judges paired with Chief Judge Cole 362 times while
Republican active judges paired with him 681 times. This averages to 72.4
pairings per other Democratic active judge (the third column) and
approximately 75.667 pairings per Republican active judge (the fourth
column) for Chief Judge Cole. The  fth column (“Active Judge Average
Difference”) is the difference between these two averages. To  nish the
example, Chief Judge Cole averaged about 3.267 more pairings per
Republican active judge than he averaged with other Democratic active
judges.
Table 1 demonstrates that Democratic active judges tend to sit slightly more
often with Republican active judges than with other Democratic active
judges, which is expected given that the average Republican sits slightly
more frequently than the average Democrat. Democratic active judges
average only 2.63 more pairings per Republican active judge than per
Democratic judge. Using a hypothesis that ideology does not impact pairings
in either direction and wherep is signi cant when less than 0.05, a paired
two-tailed t-test shows that the results are not statistically signi cant. The
two-tailed p-value here is 0.338, well outside the realm of statistical
signi cance.
Table 2 gives the equivalent information for active judges nominated by a
Republican president but with negative active average differences showing a
tendency to sit with Democratic active judges.














Boggs 927 88.625 100.1666667 -11.54166667
Batchelder 621 74.125 65.66666667 8.458333333
Gibbons 916 93.5 91.83333333 1.666666667
Rogers 957 93.5 97.83333333 -4.333333333
Sutton 989 106.75 104.3333333 2.416666667
Cook 915 90.25 92.16666667 -1.916666667
McKeague 916 90.75 90.83333333 -0.083333333
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Gri n 883 89.375 88.16666667 1.208333333
Kethledge 901 85.625 87.66666667 -2.041666667
Averages 891.6666667 90.27777778 90.96296296 -0.685185185
Again, Republican active judges have the slightest of tendencies to sit with
active judges of the opposite party. Out of all the pairings that result from an
average of 891.67 cases per Republican active judge, a Republican active
judge is likely to average only 0.69 more pairings per Democratic active judge
than per other Republican active judge. If p is signi cant when less than 0.05,
the two-tailed p-value of 0.716 is not at all statistically signi cant.
The assignment system thus seems to work well for assigning active judges
to sit with other active judges. A couple Democratic judges (Judges Moore
and Clay) and several Republican judges (Judges Batchelder, Gibbons,
Sutton, and Gri n) even bucked the overall trends for their sets.
The same cannot be said for senior judges. Table 3 gives the statistics for
the rates at which Democratic senior judges sit with active judges, with
positive numbers representing tendencies to pair with other Democratic
judges.
















Daughtrey 504 74.83333333 52.44444444 22.38888889
Merritt 492 62.33333333 45.88888889 16.44444444
Gilman 412 54.5 42.44444444 12.05555556
Keith 452 52.83333333 48 4.833333333
Averages 465 61.125 47.19444444 13.93055556
Democratic senior judges are far more likely to pair with Democratic active
judges than with Republican active judges. This effect is consistent for all
four Democratic senior judges regardless of how many cases they
participated in. For example, Judge Daughtrey, the Democratic senior judge
with the most sittings, averaged only 52.444 pairings per Republican active
judge despite averaging 74.833 pairings per Democratic active judge. If pis
[41]
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signi cant when less than 0.05, then these pairing differences were
statistically signi cant with a two-tailed p-value of 0.033.
Peering into the panel assignments for Judge Daughtrey even further reveals
the effect of this preference on panel ideological balances.  Excluding two
en banc cases and one evenly split must panel that Daughtrey sat on, Table 4
gives the expected and actual ideological breakdown for Judge Daughtrey’s
501 three-judge panels.
Table 4: Judge Daughtrey Three-Judge Panel Statistics
Methodology 1 D 2 D 3 D D Majority
Expected

































































Judge Daughtrey’s panels had a Democratic majority 74.85% of the time,
which is roughly what we would expect if the Sixth Circuit had an even
ideological balance. But Democratic nominees had a seven to nine minority
[42]
[43]
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among active judges until August 2013 and a six to nine minority after Judge
Martin’s resignation. For Judge Daughtrey, the Sixth Circuit might as well
have had at least one more active Democratic judge. Her pairings also
maximized ideological sway with far more two-Democrat panels than we
would expect even if the Sixth Circuit were evenly divided.
A chi-squared test for normality shows that Judge Daughtrey’s pairings were
not consistent with a normal distribution. Such a test compares the actual
sitting statistics with the expected sitting statistics and considers the
likelihood that deviations are simply random. Here, the chi-squared p-values
were 0.003159 if an even split is expected; 0.003164 compared to the 7–9
split; and 0.000003 compared to the 6–9 split. All of these p-values indicate
that the pairings were not normally distributed.
Nevertheless, Judge Daughtrey’s odd pairings are not the result of, say, Chief
Judge Cole assigning himself to sit with Judge Daughtrey in otherwise
evenly divided panels to maximize her voting power. Since Chief Judge Cole
became chief judge in August 2014 and through the end of 2018, all 45 of
Chief Judge Cole and Judge Daughtrey’s non-en banc panels were three-
Democrat panels. The opposite was true for other Democratic senior judges.
From August 2014 through 2018, Judges Merritt (35 times), Gilman (35
times), and Keith (12 times) had a total of 82 pairings with Chief Judge Cole
on three-judge panels. Three of the pairings resulted in three-Democrat
panels: two of these pairings came from a single must panel case,  and the
third pairing was from a long-running death penalty case which Chief Judge
Merritt was assigned to years earlier.  The remaining 79 pairings with Chief
Judge Cole resulted in two-Democrat panels. Chief Judge Cole  nally wound
up on a three-Democrat panel with a senior judge other than Judge
Daughtrey in March 2019 when Judges Keith and Clay joined Chief Judge
Cole to deny a stay pending appeal for Gun Owners of America, Inc.’s
challenge of the bump stock ban.
Part of the misbalance for Judge Daughtrey comes from her pairing only
sixteen times with Judge Batchelder and three times with Judge Boggs (two
of which were en banc cases and one of which was a must panel originating
from a 2004 decision). Judge Batchelder paired with Judge Daughtrey fewer
times than with any other senior judge even though Judge Daughtrey had the
second highest case total among senior judges. Since October 2007, during
the time Judge Boggs was chief judge, it appears that Judges Boggs and
Daughtrey have sat together for, at most, one Westlaw decision  that is not
an en banc, death penalty, or must panel case—each of which is a category
that the Sixth Circuit assignment procedures treat separately from the
normal process. This lone 2009 decision, however, was in an appeal
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automated assignment system or a highly improbable event is occurring, it
appears someone is deliberately separating Judges Boggs and Daughtrey,
possibly as part of the “avoiding acrimony” approach to assignment that
some circuit judges have described.
All four Republican senior judges also have an a nity for ideologically
similar active judges as seen in Table 5, where positives indicate a
Republican lean.
















Siler 677 82.55555556 66.66666667 15.88888889
Guy 338 43.22222222 35.66666667 7.555555556
Suhrheinrich 380 44.33333333 37.5 6.833333333
Norris 212 29.44444444 27.33333333 2.111111111
Averages 401.75 49.88888889 41.79166667 8.097222222
Accounting for the fact that Republican senior judges sat in fewer cases
overall than Democratic senior judges (401.75 average cases to 465 average
cases), Republican senior judges still had a smaller average difference in
ideological pairings. The Republican senior judge pairing results had a two-
tailedp-value of 0.066 and thus, unlike the Democratic senior judge results,
were not statistically signi cant if statistical signi cance is where p is less
than 0.05. The ideological pairing trend is stronger for Democratic senior
judges than for Republicans.
Nevertheless, the pairing statistics still suggest that Republican senior
judges tend to sit more frequently with Republican active judges. The two-
tailed t-test assesses the hypothesis that pairings do not vary by ideology in
either direction. A one-tailed t-test, in contrast, looks for a correlation in one
direction. In other words, a one-tailed t-test assesses the hypothesis that
judges tend to pair with ideologically similar judges. With such a one-tailed t-
test, the results become statistically signi cant and produce a p-value of
0.033.
[48]
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Interestingly, the Republican senior judge with the largest sample of cases
(Judge Siler) had the least random assignments among Republicans while
the Republican judge with the smallest sample of cases (Judge Norris) had
the most random assignments among all senior judges. This runs counter to
the intuition, if case assignment is truly random, that increasing the sample
size would tend to decrease variances that would create the impression of
nonrandomness.
V.  Looking Ahead to the Future of the Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit’s apparent nonrandom assignment of senior judges may
begin to favor Democratic-nominated judges less and less. Since the
conclusion of the time period analyzed in this Essay, President Trump has
appointed  ve active judges (Judges Bush, Larsen, Nalbandian, Readler, and
Murphy) to replace  ve Republican Sixth Circuit judges who took senior
status (Judges Boggs, Batchelder, Rogers, Cook, and McKeague) and one
active judge (Judge Thapar) to  ll Judge Martin’s long-vacant seat. The
death of senior Judge Keith, who tended to hear many cases with his former
clerk Judge Clay, will further dilute the Democratic pool of judges. The effect
of this transformation in the Sixth Circuit remains unseen and will depend on
how often the newly senior judges choose to sit. But if the experience of
2012 through 2016 is any guide, the propensity of senior judges to sit with
active judges nominated by a president of the same party might enhance the
ideological in uence of these Republican senior judges. Plus, Judge
Daughtrey’s tendency not to sit with Judges Boggs and Batchelder will
become less of a factor in strengthening Judge Daughtrey’s Democratic-
pairing lean as new active judges—without any bad blood—have replaced
Judges Boggs and Batchelder in the assignment process.
________________________________________________________________
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